[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":841},["ShallowReactive",2],{"buffett-1962-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin":3},{"id":4,"title":5,"body":6,"category":829,"description":830,"extension":831,"meta":832,"navigation":833,"order":834,"path":835,"seo":836,"seoDescription":830,"seoTitle":837,"slug":838,"stem":839,"__hash__":840},"buffett\u002Fbuffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1962-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin.md","1962 巴菲特致合伙人信",{"type":7,"value":8,"toc":825},"minimark",[9,13,17,20,23,26,30,33,36,146,149,152,155,267,270,273,276,279,282,343,346,349,352,355,358,361,537,540,543,546,549,552,554,777,780,783,786,789,792,795,798,801,804,807,810,813,816,819,822],[10,11,5],"h1",{"id":12},"_1962-巴菲特致合伙人信",[14,15,16],"p",{},"巴菲特合伙公司（BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.）",[14,18,19],{},"810 KIEWIT PLAZA",[14,21,22],{},"奥马哈 31，内布拉斯加州",[14,24,25],{},"1963年1月18日",[10,27,29],{"id":28},"_1962年业绩","1962年业绩",[14,31,32],{},"我一直告诉合伙人，我的期望是这样的：道指下跌的年份，我们要大显身手；道指上涨的年份，不管涨多少，我们都可能相形见绌。1962年，这个预期得到了印证。",[14,34,35],{},"由于市场在最后几个月大幅反弹，从道指的全年走势来看，大盘的跌幅并没有很多人想象的那么触目惊心。道指年初731点，六月探底535点，但年底收于652点。1960年底道指收在616点，所以你看，虽然这几年上蹿下跳热闹非凡，整个投资界其实没离开1959年或1960年附近多远。持有道指的投资者去年市值缩水了79.04点，跌幅10.8%——我猜，那些1961年还在追炒高飞股票的人，现在肯定有人懊悔当初没买指数。另外，持有道指还能收到约23.30点的股息，加上股息，道指全年整体收益率为负7.6%。我们自己的整体业绩是正13.9%。下表列出了道指、合伙基金（普通合伙人分成前）及有限合伙人，在巴菲特合伙公司及前身合伙机构历年完整年度的逐年业绩：",[37,38,39,58],"table",{},[40,41,42],"thead",{},[43,44,45,49,52,55],"tr",{},[46,47,48],"th",{},"年份",[46,50,51],{},"道指整体收益率",[46,53,54],{},"合伙基金收益率（注1）",[46,56,57],{},"有限合伙人收益率（注2）",[59,60,61,76,90,104,118,132],"tbody",{},[43,62,63,67,70,73],{},[64,65,66],"td",{},"1957",[64,68,69],{},"-8.4%",[64,71,72],{},"10.4%",[64,74,75],{},"9.3%",[43,77,78,81,84,87],{},[64,79,80],{},"1958",[64,82,83],{},"38.5%",[64,85,86],{},"40.9%",[64,88,89],{},"32.2%",[43,91,92,95,98,101],{},[64,93,94],{},"1959",[64,96,97],{},"20.0%",[64,99,100],{},"25.9%",[64,102,103],{},"20.9%",[43,105,106,109,112,115],{},[64,107,108],{},"1960",[64,110,111],{},"-6.2%",[64,113,114],{},"22.8%",[64,116,117],{},"18.6%",[43,119,120,123,126,129],{},[64,121,122],{},"1961",[64,124,125],{},"22.4%",[64,127,128],{},"45.9%",[64,130,131],{},"35.9%",[43,133,134,137,140,143],{},[64,135,136],{},"1962",[64,138,139],{},"-7.6%",[64,141,142],{},"13.9%",[64,144,145],{},"11.9%",[14,147,148],{},"（注1）1957–61年数据为同期管理的全部有限合伙账户的综合业绩，已扣除全部运营费用，未计向有限合伙人支付的利息及普通合伙人分成。",[14,150,151],{},"（注2）1957–61年数据根据前列合伙基金收益率，按现行合伙协议扣除普通合伙人分成后计算得出。",[14,153,154],{},"下表为上述三者的累计（复合）收益率及平均年化复合收益率：",[37,156,157,171],{},[40,158,159],{},[43,160,161,163,165,168],{},[46,162,48],{},[46,164,51],{},[46,166,167],{},"合伙基金收益率",[46,169,170],{},"有限合伙人收益率",[59,172,173,183,197,211,225,239,253],{},[43,174,175,177,179,181],{},[64,176,66],{},[64,178,69],{},[64,180,72],{},[64,182,75],{},[43,184,185,188,191,194],{},[64,186,187],{},"1957–58",[64,189,190],{},"26.9%",[64,192,193],{},"55.6%",[64,195,196],{},"44.5%",[43,198,199,202,205,208],{},[64,200,201],{},"1957–59",[64,203,204],{},"52.3%",[64,206,207],{},"95.9%",[64,209,210],{},"74.7%",[43,212,213,216,219,222],{},[64,214,215],{},"1957–60",[64,217,218],{},"42.9%",[64,220,221],{},"140.6%",[64,223,224],{},"107.2%",[43,226,227,230,233,236],{},[64,228,229],{},"1957–61",[64,231,232],{},"74.9%",[64,234,235],{},"251.0%",[64,237,238],{},"181.6%",[43,240,241,244,247,250],{},[64,242,243],{},"1957–62",[64,245,246],{},"61.6%",[64,248,249],{},"299.8%",[64,251,252],{},"215.1%",[43,254,255,258,261,264],{},[64,256,257],{},"年化复合收益率",[64,259,260],{},"8.3%",[64,262,263],{},"26.0%",[64,265,266],{},"21.1%",[14,268,269],{},"我有个不太科学的看法：任何投资组合，长期年化收益率能超越道指10个百分点，大概就是极限了。所以请各位在心里对上述某些数字做一点自我调整。",[14,271,272],{},"有些合伙人曾担心规模扩大会影响业绩，这个问题我在去年的年度信里讨论过。当时的结论是：规模大，有些情况下是优势，有些情况下是拖累，综合来看不会损害业绩。我说过，如果我的判断有变，会及时告知大家。1957年初，合伙基金总资产为303,726美元，到1962年初已增长至7,178,500美元。就目前来看，随着资产规模扩大，我们相对道指的优势并未显现出收窄的迹象。",[10,274,275],{"id":275},"复利的魔力",[14,277,278],{},"据说伊莎贝拉女王（Isabella）当年资助哥伦布的费用大约是30,000美元。这笔风险投资通常被认为相当成功。先不管发现新大陆带来的精神满足感，就算最后\"逆权侵占\"（squatter's rights）真的站得住脚，这笔买卖也没那么神奇。粗略算一下：30,000美元，按每年4%的复利增长，到1962年大约会变成2,000,000,000,000美元——不是政府统计官员的，可能不太认识这个数，告诉你，这是2万亿美元。同样的算法，也可以替曼哈顿的印第安人申辩几句。这种令人目眩的几何级数，说明了一件事：要想变得非常富有，要么活得足够长，要么让钱以相当高的利率复利滚雪球。对于前者，我没什么有用的建议。",[14,280,281],{},"下表列出了100,000美元分别以5%、10%和15%的复合收益率，经过10年、20年和30年后的结果。每次看到这张表，我都觉得神奇——利率上仅仅几个百分点的差距，日积月累，最终的差距会大得惊人。正因如此，尽管我们追求更高的收益率，但我觉得只要能领先道指几个百分点，这份努力就非常值得。十年、二十年下来，这就是一大笔财富。",[37,283,284,299],{},[40,285,286],{},[43,287,288,290,293,296],{},[46,289],{},[46,291,292],{},"5%",[46,294,295],{},"10%",[46,297,298],{},"15%",[59,300,301,315,329],{},[43,302,303,306,309,312],{},[64,304,305],{},"10年",[64,307,308],{},"$162,889",[64,310,311],{},"$259,374",[64,313,314],{},"$404,553",[43,316,317,320,323,326],{},[64,318,319],{},"20年",[64,321,322],{},"$265,328",[64,324,325],{},"$672,748",[64,327,328],{},"$1,636,640",[43,330,331,334,337,340],{},[64,332,333],{},"30年",[64,335,336],{},"$432,191",[64,338,339],{},"$1,744,930",[64,341,342],{},"$6,621,140",[10,344,345],{"id":345},"登普斯特风车制造公司",[14,347,348],{},"1962年业绩的亮点，就是我们目前持股73%的控股投资——登普斯特风车制造公司（Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company）。登普斯特的主营业务是农具（大多数产品零售价在1,000美元以内）、灌溉系统、水井设备以及管道铺设。",[14,350,351],{},"过去十年，这家公司销售额停滞不前、存货周转率低下，投入资本几乎毫无回报。",[14,353,354],{},"1961年8月，我们取得了控股权，买入均价约为每股28美元——早些年有一部分低至每股16美元，大多数是当年8月通过一笔以30.25美元报价的大宗收购获得的。一旦取得控股权，首要考量就变成了资产本身的价值，而非股票这张纸的市场报价。",[14,356,357],{},"去年，我们对登普斯特各项资产分别打了折扣来估值。这些折扣是基于它们目前不能创造盈利的现状，不考虑潜力，只考虑短期内快速变现能得到多少钱。我们的任务，就是让这些资产以不错的复利速度增值。以下是登普斯特去年的合并资产负债表及公允价值计算：",[14,359,360],{},"（单位：千美元）",[37,362,363,384],{},[40,364,365],{},[43,366,367,370,373,376,379,382],{},[46,368,369],{},"资产",[46,371,372],{},"账面价值",[46,374,375],{},"折扣率",[46,377,378],{},"调整后价值",[46,380,381],{},"负债",[46,383],{},[59,385,386,405,425,443,461,480,498,518],{},[43,387,388,391,394,397,399,402],{},[64,389,390],{},"现金",[64,392,393],{},"$166",[64,395,396],{},"100%",[64,398,393],{},[64,400,401],{},"应付票据",[64,403,404],{},"$1,230",[43,406,407,410,413,416,419,422],{},[64,408,409],{},"应收账款（净值）",[64,411,412],{},"$1,040",[64,414,415],{},"85%",[64,417,418],{},"$884",[64,420,421],{},"其他负债",[64,423,424],{},"$1,088",[43,426,427,430,433,436,439,441],{},[64,428,429],{},"存货",[64,431,432],{},"$4,203",[64,434,435],{},"60%",[64,437,438],{},"$2,522",[64,440],{},[64,442],{},[43,444,445,448,451,454,457,459],{},[64,446,447],{},"预付账款等",[64,449,450],{},"$82",[64,452,453],{},"25%",[64,455,456],{},"$21",[64,458],{},[64,460],{},[43,462,463,466,469,471,474,477],{},[64,464,465],{},"流动资产合计",[64,467,468],{},"$5,491",[64,470],{},[64,472,473],{},"$3,593",[64,475,476],{},"负债合计",[64,478,479],{},"$2,318",[43,481,482,485,488,490,492,495],{},[64,483,484],{},"人寿保险等现金价值",[64,486,487],{},"$45",[64,489,396],{},[64,491,487],{},[64,493,494],{},"账面净资产",[64,496,497],{},"$4,601",[43,499,500,503,506,509,512,515],{},[64,501,502],{},"厂房设备净值",[64,504,505],{},"$1,383",[64,507,508],{},"拍卖净值估算",[64,510,511],{},"$800",[64,513,514],{},"按快速变现价值调整后的净资产",[64,516,517],{},"$2,120",[43,519,520,523,526,528,531,534],{},[64,521,522],{},"总资产",[64,524,525],{},"$6,919",[64,527],{},[64,529,530],{},"$4,438",[64,532,533],{},"流通股60,146股，调整后每股价值",[64,535,536],{},"$35.25",[14,538,539],{},"登普斯特的财政年度截至11月30日。由于完整审计报告当时尚未出炉，我估算了部分数字，四舍五入后得出去年登普斯特每股价值约为35美元。",[14,541,542],{},"起初，我们希望与原有管理层携手，共同提升资本效率、改善利润率、削减管理费用。这番努力完全徒劳。白白耗费了约六个月后，我们发现管理层对我们的目标只是嘴上应付——不管是能力不够还是意愿不足，总之什么也没做成。必须换人。",[14,544,545],{},"我有一位好朋友，素来不爱夸大其词，但他极力向我推荐哈里·博特尔（Harry Bottle），说他正是解决我们这类问题的人。1962年4月17日，我在洛杉矶与哈里见面，谈好了与目标挂钩的薪酬方案，4月23日他就已经坐在内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯（Beatrice）的总裁椅子上了。",[14,547,548],{},"哈里毫无疑问是我们的年度之星。我们给他设定的每一个目标，他都完成了，而且每次都给我们带来意外的惊喜。他一件接一件地完成了原本被认为不可能的任务，而且总是先挑最硬的骨头啃。我们的盈亏平衡点几乎降低了一半，滞销或毫无价值的存货被清仓或核销，营销流程全面改革，没有盈利能力的设施统统卖掉。",[14,550,551],{},"哈里工作的成果，从下面的资产负债表中可见一斑。由于这些资产仍属于不能盈利的资产，依旧按去年的方法估值：",[14,553,360],{},[37,555,556,572],{},[40,557,558],{},[43,559,560,562,564,566,568,570],{},[46,561,369],{},[46,563,372],{},[46,565,375],{},[46,567,378],{},[46,569,381],{},[46,571],{},[59,573,574,590,609,625,641,656,673,690,705,723,741,759],{},[43,575,576,578,581,583,585,587],{},[64,577,390],{},[64,579,580],{},"$60",[64,582,396],{},[64,584,580],{},[64,586,401],{},[64,588,589],{},"$0",[43,591,592,595,598,601,604,606],{},[64,593,594],{},"可供出售证券",[64,596,597],{},"$758",[64,599,600],{},"1962年12月31日市值",[64,602,603],{},"$834",[64,605,421],{},[64,607,608],{},"$346",[43,610,611,613,616,618,621,623],{},[64,612,409],{},[64,614,615],{},"$796",[64,617,415],{},[64,619,620],{},"$676",[64,622,476],{},[64,624,608],{},[43,626,627,629,632,634,637,639],{},[64,628,429],{},[64,630,631],{},"$1,634",[64,633,435],{},[64,635,636],{},"$981",[64,638],{},[64,640],{},[43,642,643,645,648,650,652,654],{},[64,644,484],{},[64,646,647],{},"$41",[64,649,396],{},[64,651,647],{},[64,653],{},[64,655],{},[43,657,658,661,664,666,668,670],{},[64,659,660],{},"递延所得税资产",[64,662,663],{},"$170",[64,665,396],{},[64,667,663],{},[64,669,494],{},[64,671,672],{},"$4,077",[43,674,675,677,680,682,685,687],{},[64,676,447],{},[64,678,679],{},"$14",[64,681,453],{},[64,683,684],{},"$4",[64,686,514],{},[64,688,689],{},"$3,125",[43,691,692,694,696,698,701,703],{},[64,693],{},[64,695],{},[64,697],{},[64,699,700],{},"加：哈里·博特尔期权潜在行权收益",[64,702,580],{},[64,704],{},[43,706,707,709,712,714,717,720],{},[64,708,465],{},[64,710,711],{},"$3,473",[64,713],{},[64,715,716],{},"$2,766",[64,718,719],{},"流通股",[64,721,722],{},"60,146股",[43,724,725,728,731,733,735,738],{},[64,726,727],{},"其他投资",[64,729,730],{},"$5",[64,732,396],{},[64,734,730],{},[64,736,737],{},"加：期权行权后新增股份",[64,739,740],{},"2,000股",[43,742,743,745,748,750,753,756],{},[64,744,502],{},[64,746,747],{},"$945",[64,749,508],{},[64,751,752],{},"$700",[64,754,755],{},"总股本",[64,757,758],{},"62,146股",[43,760,761,763,766,768,771,774],{},[64,762,522],{},[64,764,765],{},"$4,423",[64,767],{},[64,769,770],{},"$3,471",[64,772,773],{},"调整后每股价值",[64,775,776],{},"$51.26",[14,778,779],{},"有三点值得特别关注：",[14,781,782],{},"（1）虽然经过清理核销（存货核销550,000美元；固定资产出售价格高于账面价值）后净资产略有减少，但我们将资产变现的速度远远超过了当初估值时的预期。",[14,784,785],{},"（2）可以说，我们把不赚钱的制造业务资产转化成了赚钱的生意——证券投资。",[14,787,788],{},"（3）以极低的价格买入资产，我们根本不需要变什么戏法，就能获得极高的收益率。这正是我们投资理念的基石：\"永远不指望能卖出好价钱。要把买入价定得足够吸引人，哪怕卖出价格平平也能赚得盆满钵满。多赚的，不过是锦上添花。\"",[14,790,791],{},"1963年1月2日，登普斯特获得了一笔1,250,000美元的无担保定期贷款。加上已经\"释放\"出来的资金，我们可以为登普斯特构建一个折合每股约35美元的证券投资组合——远超我们当初买入整个公司所付出的价格。因此，目前我们对登普斯特的估值包含两部分：制造业务约每股16美元，证券投资组合约每股35美元（投资方式与巴菲特合伙公司基本相同）。",[14,793,794],{},"我们当然致力于让制造业务的这16美元以较高的复利增值，我们也有一些好想法去实现这个目标。如果公司能按现在的状态赚到钱，这就好办多了；就算赚不到钱，我们也有应对的方案。",[14,796,797],{},"有一点需要说明：去年登普斯特完全是一个资产转化问题，因此与股市涨跌毫无关系，成败完全取决于我们处置资产的成效。1963年，制造业务资产依然重要，但从估值角度来说，由于我们将登普斯特的大量资金按照合伙基金的方式投入低估类股票，它的表现将更接近低估类。出于税务考虑，我们可能不会将登普斯特的资金用于套利。因此，今年道指的涨跌将对登普斯特的估值产生显著影响——这与去年大部分时间的情况截然不同。",[14,799,800],{},"最后，还有一件对巴菲特合伙公司真正重要的事。我们现在有了一位善于经营公司的人才，在未来的控制类投资中，他将大有裨益。哈里在接手之前的六天，根本没想过自己会去管一家农具公司。但他适应能力强、勤奋努力、一旦方向确定就雷厉风行。他希望干得好、拿得多——我喜欢这样的人，不像某些经理人，满脑子想的是怎么把总裁洗手间装上镀金水龙头。",[14,802,803],{},"哈里和我彼此欣赏，他与巴菲特合伙公司的合作，对我们所有人都是赢家。",[10,805,806],{"id":806},"例行预测",[14,808,809],{},"我肯定不会预测今后一两年的宏观经济或股市走势，因为我根本不知道。",[14,811,812],{},"我可以相当有把握地说，在未来十年里，肯定会有几年大盘上涨20%甚至25%，也会有几年同等幅度的下跌，其余年份则在两者之间。这些年份以什么顺序出现，我毫无概念，对长期投资者来说，这也没什么大不了。把前面第一张表里的年份顺序随便打乱，复合收益率仍然不变。假设今后四年道指的收益率分别是+40%、-30%、+10%和-6%，只要四年后我们都还在，具体顺序对我们来说根本无关紧要。从长期来看，算上股息和市值增长，道指的年复合收益率大概在5%左右。尽管过去十年涨幅不小，但凡是期望道指能给出明显更高回报的投资者，恐怕都要失望而归。",[14,814,815],{},"我们的工作，就是年复一年地积累相对道指的优势，不必太在意某一年的绝对收益是正是负。在我看来，道指下跌25%而我们只下跌15%的年份，比我们与道指都上涨20%的年份要好得多。",[14,817,818],{},"正如我在讲投资方法时已经说明的，相对道指而言，我们表现最好的年份很可能出现在市场下跌或平盘的时候。因此，我们取得的相对收益将会时高时低，差异悬殊。肯定会有我们落后道指的年份，但如果从长期来看，我们能平均每年跑赢道指10个百分点，我就认为结果是令人满意的。",[14,820,821],{},"具体来说：如果某年市场下跌35%至40%（我认为未来十年某个年份出现这种情况的概率相当高，只是谁都不知道是哪年），我们应该只下跌15%至20%；如果市场全年基本持平，我们希望能上涨约10个百分点；如果市场大涨20%以上，我们就很难跟上了。从1962年12月31日的水平上涨20%或25%，我们能否跟上是相当值得怀疑的。如果我们长期保持上述表现，且道指年复合收益率约为5%，那么我们的年收益率应该能达到15%左右。",[14,823,824],{},"上面这些预期听起来可能有些大胆，到了1965年或1970年回头来看，也许真的会显得大胆。就算长期预测准确，任何一年的实际表现也可能与预期偏差很大。当然，这样的期望背后肯定存在相当程度的个人偏见，这一点大家要有所意识。",{"title":826,"searchDepth":827,"depth":827,"links":828},"",2,[],"致股东信","1962年巴菲特致合伙人信，总结年度投资业绩、阐述低估类投资策略及雪茄屁股投资法","md",{},true,8,"\u002Fbuffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1962-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin",{"title":5,"description":830},"1962 巴菲特致合伙人信｜巴菲特","1962-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin","buffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1962-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin","WagBLDSuK9HcDcaRusVF0S8c4mf_G8ijKfCoV_1SzXA",1778061723888]