[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":950},["ShallowReactive",2],{"buffett-1968-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin":3},{"id":4,"title":5,"body":6,"category":938,"description":939,"extension":940,"meta":941,"navigation":942,"order":943,"path":944,"seo":945,"seoDescription":939,"seoTitle":946,"slug":947,"stem":948,"__hash__":949},"buffett\u002Fbuffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1968-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin.md","1968 巴菲特致合伙人信",{"type":7,"value":8,"toc":930},"minimark",[9,13,17,20,23,26,29,32,225,231,234,431,434,437,736,741,744,747,750,755,758,761,764,767,868,871,895,898,901,904,907,910,913,916,919,922,924,927],[10,11,5],"h1",{"id":12},"_1968-巴菲特致合伙人信",[14,15,16],"p",{},"1969 年 1 月 22 日",[10,18,19],{"id":19},"年的业绩",[14,21,22],{},"谁都有犯错的时候。",[14,24,25],{},"1968 年年初，我对巴菲特合伙基金的前景感到前所未有的悲观，但是，去年我们实现了 40,032,691 美元的总收益。主要是因为我们抓住了一个很简单、很合理的机会，这个机会正好成熟了(投资机会像女人一样，招人喜欢，却难以捉摸)。",[14,27,28],{},"我相信各位都保持着知识分子的纯洁性，不会把上面的收益数字当回事，而是希望我报告一下相对道指的表现。去年，将股息计算在内，道指的收益率是上涨 7.7%，我们的收益率是上涨 58.8%，创造了新纪录。大家应该把这个业绩看成是极端异常情况，就像在桥牌中一连抓了 13 张黑桃，你叫到大满贯，却不动声色，把钱装在兜里，继续打下一局。我们也会有运气不好的时候。",[14,30,31],{},"下面是道指收益率、普通合伙人分成前合伙基金收益率(收益超过 6% 的部分，普通合伙人提取 25%)以及有限合伙人收益率的最新逐年对比情况。",[33,34,35,54],"table",{},[36,37,38],"thead",{},[39,40,41,45,48,51],"tr",{},[42,43,44],"th",{},"年份",[42,46,47],{},"道指整体收益率 (1)",[42,49,50],{},"合伙基金收益率 (2)",[42,52,53],{},"有限合伙人收益率 (3)",[55,56,57,72,86,100,114,128,142,156,170,184,198,211],"tbody",{},[39,58,59,63,66,69],{},[60,61,62],"td",{},"1957",[60,64,65],{},"-8.4%",[60,67,68],{},"10.4%",[60,70,71],{},"9.3%",[39,73,74,77,80,83],{},[60,75,76],{},"1958",[60,78,79],{},"38.5%",[60,81,82],{},"40.9%",[60,84,85],{},"32.2%",[39,87,88,91,94,97],{},[60,89,90],{},"1959",[60,92,93],{},"20.0%",[60,95,96],{},"25.9%",[60,98,99],{},"20.9%",[39,101,102,105,108,111],{},[60,103,104],{},"1960",[60,106,107],{},"-6.2%",[60,109,110],{},"22.8%",[60,112,113],{},"18.6%",[39,115,116,119,122,125],{},[60,117,118],{},"1961",[60,120,121],{},"22.4%",[60,123,124],{},"45.9%",[60,126,127],{},"35.9%",[39,129,130,133,136,139],{},[60,131,132],{},"1962",[60,134,135],{},"-7.6%",[60,137,138],{},"13.9%",[60,140,141],{},"11.9%",[39,143,144,147,150,153],{},[60,145,146],{},"1963",[60,148,149],{},"20.6%",[60,151,152],{},"38.7%",[60,154,155],{},"30.5%",[39,157,158,161,164,167],{},[60,159,160],{},"1964",[60,162,163],{},"18.7%",[60,165,166],{},"27.8%",[60,168,169],{},"22.3%",[39,171,172,175,178,181],{},[60,173,174],{},"1965",[60,176,177],{},"14.2%",[60,179,180],{},"47.2%",[60,182,183],{},"36.9%",[39,185,186,189,192,195],{},[60,187,188],{},"1966",[60,190,191],{},"-15.6%",[60,193,194],{},"20.4%",[60,196,197],{},"16.8%",[39,199,200,203,206,208],{},[60,201,202],{},"1967",[60,204,205],{},"19.0%",[60,207,127],{},[60,209,210],{},"28.4%",[39,212,213,216,219,222],{},[60,214,215],{},"1968",[60,217,218],{},"7.7%",[60,220,221],{},"58.8%",[60,223,224],{},"45.6%",[226,227,228],"blockquote",{},[14,229,230],{},"(1) 根据道指年度涨跌计算，其中包含股息。表格中为合伙基金整年运作的年份。\n(2) 1957-61 年的数据是之前全年管理的所有有限合伙人账户的综合业绩，其中扣除了经营费用，未计算有限合伙人利息和普通合伙人分成。\n(3) 1957-61 年的数据按前一列合伙基金收益率计算得出，按照当前合伙协议，扣除了普通合伙人分成。",[14,232,233],{},"下表是累计收益率或复合收益率：",[33,235,236,251],{},[36,237,238],{},[39,239,240,242,245,248],{},[42,241,44],{},[42,243,244],{},"道指整体收益率",[42,246,247],{},"合伙基金收益率",[42,249,250],{},"有限合伙人收益率",[55,252,253,263,277,291,305,319,333,347,361,375,389,403,417],{},[39,254,255,257,259,261],{},[60,256,62],{},[60,258,65],{},[60,260,68],{},[60,262,71],{},[39,264,265,268,271,274],{},[60,266,267],{},"1957 – 58",[60,269,270],{},"26.9%",[60,272,273],{},"55.6%",[60,275,276],{},"44.5%",[39,278,279,282,285,288],{},[60,280,281],{},"1957 – 59",[60,283,284],{},"52.3%",[60,286,287],{},"95.9%",[60,289,290],{},"74.7%",[39,292,293,296,299,302],{},[60,294,295],{},"1957 – 60",[60,297,298],{},"42.9%",[60,300,301],{},"140.6%",[60,303,304],{},"107.2%",[39,306,307,310,313,316],{},[60,308,309],{},"1957 – 61",[60,311,312],{},"74.9%",[60,314,315],{},"251.0%",[60,317,318],{},"181.6%",[39,320,321,324,327,330],{},[60,322,323],{},"1957 – 62",[60,325,326],{},"61.6%",[60,328,329],{},"299.8%",[60,331,332],{},"215.1%",[39,334,335,338,341,344],{},[60,336,337],{},"1957 – 63",[60,339,340],{},"94.9%",[60,342,343],{},"454.5%",[60,345,346],{},"311.2%",[39,348,349,352,355,358],{},[60,350,351],{},"1957 - 64",[60,353,354],{},"131.3%",[60,356,357],{},"608.7%",[60,359,360],{},"402.9%",[39,362,363,366,369,372],{},[60,364,365],{},"1957 - 65",[60,367,368],{},"164.1%",[60,370,371],{},"943.2%",[60,373,374],{},"588.5%",[39,376,377,380,383,386],{},[60,378,379],{},"1957 - 66",[60,381,382],{},"122.9%",[60,384,385],{},"1156.0%",[60,387,388],{},"704.2%",[39,390,391,394,397,400],{},[60,392,393],{},"1957 - 67",[60,395,396],{},"165.3%",[60,398,399],{},"1606.9%",[60,401,402],{},"932.6%",[39,404,405,408,411,414],{},[60,406,407],{},"1957 - 68",[60,409,410],{},"185.7%",[60,412,413],{},"2610.6%",[60,415,416],{},"1403.5%",[39,418,419,422,425,428],{},[60,420,421],{},"年化复合收益率",[60,423,424],{},"9.1%",[60,426,427],{},"31.6%",[60,429,430],{},"25.3%",[10,432,433],{"id":433},"基金公司",[14,435,436],{},"和往常一样，下面是股票投资占 95-100% 的最大的两只开放式股票型基金（从 1957 年到 1966 年，这两只基金是规模最大的，现在是第二大和第三大）以及分散投资的最大的两只封闭式股票型基金的业绩，与合伙基金的收益率的对比情况。",[33,438,439,463],{},[36,440,441],{},[39,442,443,445,448,451,454,457,460],{},[42,444,44],{},[42,446,447],{},"Mass. Inv. Trust (1)",[42,449,450],{},"Investors Stock (1)",[42,452,453],{},"Lehman (2)",[42,455,456],{},"Tri-Cont. (2)",[42,458,459],{},"道指",[42,461,462],{},"有限合伙人实际收益率",[55,464,465,484,504,524,544,564,584,603,623,642,661,679,697,718],{},[39,466,467,469,472,475,477,480,482],{},[60,468,62],{},[60,470,471],{},"-11.4%",[60,473,474],{},"-12.4%",[60,476,471],{},[60,478,479],{},"-2.4%",[60,481,65],{},[60,483,71],{},[39,485,486,488,491,494,497,500,502],{},[60,487,76],{},[60,489,490],{},"42.7%",[60,492,493],{},"47.5%",[60,495,496],{},"40.8%",[60,498,499],{},"33.2%",[60,501,79],{},[60,503,85],{},[39,505,506,508,511,514,517,520,522],{},[60,507,90],{},[60,509,510],{},"9.0%",[60,512,513],{},"10.3%",[60,515,516],{},"8.1%",[60,518,519],{},"8.4%",[60,521,93],{},[60,523,99],{},[39,525,526,528,531,534,537,540,542],{},[60,527,104],{},[60,529,530],{},"-1.0%",[60,532,533],{},"-0.6%",[60,535,536],{},"2.5%",[60,538,539],{},"2.8%",[60,541,107],{},[60,543,113],{},[39,545,546,548,551,554,557,560,562],{},[60,547,118],{},[60,549,550],{},"25.6%",[60,552,553],{},"24.9%",[60,555,556],{},"23.6%",[60,558,559],{},"22.5%",[60,561,121],{},[60,563,127],{},[39,565,566,568,571,574,577,580,582],{},[60,567,132],{},[60,569,570],{},"-9.8%",[60,572,573],{},"-13.4%",[60,575,576],{},"-14.4%",[60,578,579],{},"-10.0%",[60,581,135],{},[60,583,141],{},[39,585,586,588,590,593,596,599,601],{},[60,587,146],{},[60,589,93],{},[60,591,592],{},"16.5%",[60,594,595],{},"23.7%",[60,597,598],{},"18.3%",[60,600,149],{},[60,602,155],{},[39,604,605,607,610,613,616,619,621],{},[60,606,160],{},[60,608,609],{},"15.9%",[60,611,612],{},"14.3%",[60,614,615],{},"13.6%",[60,617,618],{},"12.6%",[60,620,163],{},[60,622,169],{},[39,624,625,627,630,633,635,638,640],{},[60,626,174],{},[60,628,629],{},"10.2%",[60,631,632],{},"9.8%",[60,634,205],{},[60,636,637],{},"10.7%",[60,639,177],{},[60,641,183],{},[39,643,644,646,649,651,654,657,659],{},[60,645,188],{},[60,647,648],{},"-7.7%",[60,650,579],{},[60,652,653],{},"-2.6%",[60,655,656],{},"-6.9%",[60,658,191],{},[60,660,197],{},[39,662,663,665,667,669,672,675,677],{},[60,664,202],{},[60,666,93],{},[60,668,110],{},[60,670,671],{},"28.0%",[60,673,674],{},"25.4%",[60,676,205],{},[60,678,210],{},[39,680,681,683,685,687,690,693,695],{},[60,682,215],{},[60,684,513],{},[60,686,516],{},[60,688,689],{},"6.7%",[60,691,692],{},"6.8%",[60,694,218],{},[60,696,224],{},[39,698,699,702,705,708,711,714,716],{},[60,700,701],{},"累计收益率",[60,703,704],{},"189.3%",[60,706,707],{},"167.7%",[60,709,710],{},"225.6%",[60,712,713],{},"200.2%",[60,715,410],{},[60,717,416],{},[39,719,720,722,724,727,729,732,734],{},[60,721,421],{},[60,723,71],{},[60,725,726],{},"8.6%",[60,728,513],{},[60,730,731],{},"9.6%",[60,733,424],{},[60,735,430],{},[226,737,738],{},[14,739,740],{},"(1) 计算包括资产价值变化以及当年持有人获得的分红。\n(2) 来源:1968 Moody's Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1967。1968 年数据为估算值。",[14,742,743],{},"12 年过去了，这四只基金目前管理 50 多亿美元的总资产，占基金行业总规模的 10% 以上，但是按年化复合收益率计算，他们的平均收益率竟然才比道指高零点几个百分点。",[14,745,746],{},"前几年高歌猛进的一些基金最近偃旗息鼓了。在投资风格激进的基金公司中，蔡至勇 (Gerald Tsai) 的曼哈顿基金 (Manhattan Fund) 最负盛名，但它 1968 年只取得了亏损 6.9% 的业绩。1968 年，很多规模较小的基金继续大幅跑赢大市，但是与前两年跑赢大市的基金数量相比，就少多了。",[14,748,749],{},"在往年的信中，每次写到基金公司这部分，我经常斥责基金公司庸懒散慢，现在很多基金公司来了个一百八十度大转弯，变得高度紧张了。有一家基金公司(这家基金公司历史悠久，一说名字各位肯定知道)的基金经理掌管着 10 亿美元以上的资金，1968 年，在发行一只新产品时，他说:",[226,751,752],{},[14,753,754],{},"“国内国际经济环境日益复杂，资产管理已成为全天候工作。一位称职的基金经理研究证券不能只看每周或每天的情况。研究证券，必须关注每一分钟的动向。”",[14,756,757],{},"哇喔!",[14,759,760],{},"听他这么一说，我每次起身去拿百事喝都感到惭愧。掌管着大笔资金的人像打了鸡血一样，而且这样的越来越多，股票就那些，谁都不知道最后的结果会怎样。这个场面，看起来很热闹，也很吓人。",[10,762,763],{"id":763},"年业绩分析",[14,765,766],{},"1968 年我们的四大类投资都表现不错。我们实现的总收益是 40,032,691 美元，具体如下:",[33,768,769,782],{},[36,770,771],{},[39,772,773,776,779],{},[42,774,775],{},"类别",[42,777,778],{},"平均投资金额",[42,780,781],{},"总收益",[55,783,784,795,806,817,828,839,848,858],{},[39,785,786,789,792],{},[60,787,788],{},"控制类",[60,790,791],{},"$24,996,998",[60,793,794],{},"$5,886,109",[39,796,797,800,803],{},[60,798,799],{},"低估类（基于产业资本视角）",[60,801,802],{},"$16,363,100",[60,804,805],{},"$21,994,736",[39,807,808,811,814],{},[60,809,810],{},"低估类（相对低估）",[60,812,813],{},"$8,766,878",[60,815,816],{},"$4,271,825",[39,818,819,822,825],{},[60,820,821],{},"套利类",[60,823,824],{},"$18,980,602",[60,826,827],{},"$7,317,128",[39,829,830,833,836],{},[60,831,832],{},"其他（包括国债）",[60,834,835],{},"$12,744,973",[60,837,838],{},"$839,496",[39,840,841,843,845],{},[60,842,781],{},[60,844],{},[60,846,847],{},"$40,309,294",[39,849,850,853,855],{},[60,851,852],{},"减：日常费用，包括利息",[60,854],{},[60,856,857],{},"$276,603",[39,859,860,863,865],{},[60,861,862],{},"净收益",[60,864],{},[60,866,867],{},"$40,032,691",[14,869,870],{},"和两年前的信中所写的一样，有几个地方需要说明一下(不想读博士学位的可以跳过这部分):",[226,872,873],{},[874,875,876,880,883,886,889,892],"ol",{},[877,878,879],"li",{},"1965 年 1 月 18 日的信中介绍了上述各个投资类别。如果你需要回顾一下，在附近的报刊亭又买不到便携版，请向我们索取。",[877,881,882],{},"分类不是严丝合缝的。一笔投资归在哪个类别，事后不会更改的，但最初归类时多少有些主观因素。有些投资不太好归类，例如，有的套利投资失败后，我仍然持有，但持有的理由已经和最初买入的理由不完全相同了(可能是因为固执)。",[877,884,885],{},"计算合伙基金收益率时，我们以年初投资金额为基准。上述表格记录的是各类投资的平均投资金额，这样计算出来的收益率比实际要低。例如，一只股票，我们 1 月 1 日以 100 美元买入，到 12 月 31 日，它上涨到 200 美元，则平均投资金额是 150 美元，收益率是 66.66%，而按照常用的计算方法，收益率则是 100%。换言之，上表中的平均投资金额是以每月的平均市值计算的。",[877,887,888],{},"所有数字均按照 100% 自有资金、无杠杆的基础计算。利息和日常费用从总收益中扣除，不分摊到各个类别。与具体某笔投资直接相关的费用，例如，因做空股票而支付的股息，直接从相应类别中扣除。在涉及融券做空的情况下，计算平均投资金额时，用多头仓位减去空头仓位得出净投资金额。",[877,890,891],{},"上述表格用处有限。各个投资类别的收益都主要来自一两笔投资。如果收集了大量稳定的数据 (例如，美国男性的死亡率)，那么可以从中得出一些结论和预测，但我们的投资不是这么回事。我们在投资中面临的是一系列不知何时出现、各有不同特点的事件，我们要前思后想，琢磨各种可能性，然后做出决定。",[877,893,894],{},"最后，我们在进行上述计算时不像数钱时那么上心，再说这也算不上纯粹的自检，所以里面可能有笔误或计算错误。",[896,897,788],"h2",{"id":788},[14,899,900],{},"总体来说，1968年控股公司交出了一份令人满意的业绩。多元零售公司（Diversified Retailing CompanyInc.）（持股80％）和伯克希尔哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）（持股70％）的税后利润合计为 500多万美元。",[14,902,903],{},"联合棉布商店（Associated Cotton Shops）和国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity）表现尤其突出，这两家公司分别是多元零售和伯克希尔哈撒韦的子公司，分别由本·罗斯纳（Ben Rosner）和杰克·林沃特（JackRingwalt） 领导。这两家公司都取得了20％左右的资本收益率。在财富 500 强公司中（美国规模最大的制造业公司排名，通用汽车居于榜首），1967年，只有37家公司的资本收益率达到了20％。IBM、通用电气（General Electric）、通用汽车（General Motors）、宝洁（Procter＆Gamble）、杜邦 （DuPont）、控制数据（Control Data）和惠普（Hewlett-Packard），这些公司虽然名气更大，但我们的经理 人取得了比他们更优秀的资本收益率。",[14,905,906],{},"现在还是有合伙人对我说这样的话：“伯克希尔涨了四块钱，太好了！”“伯克希尔上周怎么跌了三块钱，出什么情况了？”在评估控股权益时，我们不看市场价格。1967年年末，我们给伯克希尔哈撒韦的估值是25，当时市场价格是20左右。1968年年末，我们给它的估值是31，当时市场价格是37左右。要是这两年的市场价格分别是15和50，我们的估值还是会和原来一样。（“买入要花多少钱，这个是价格；买到的是什么，这个是价值。”）就控股投资而言，我们的盈亏全看生意经营情况，我们不想通过各种手段在股市获利。",[896,908,799],{"id":909},"低估类基于产业资本视角",[14,911,912],{},"这些年来，这个类别的平均收益率最高，盈利投资所占百分比也最高。我正是从低估类中领悟了投资的道理。在合伙基金早年，在我们的所有投资机会中，低估类占了很大一部分。在巴菲特合伙基金这12年的历程中，把低估类的每一笔投资都算在一起，我们实现的总利润大概是总亏损的50倍。1968 年，我们发现一个行业中存在明显的投资机会（并从多方面加以利用），结果赚了大钱。在利用这个投资机会的过程中，我们因为做了一些工作，还获得了一大笔费用（记录在审计文件中的“其他收入”中）。",[14,914,915],{},"到目前为止，在持续取得良好业绩方面，我对低估类（基于产业资本视角）的确定性最大。但是，现在我们在这个类别的总投资还不到200万美元，而且我一个备选机会都没有。1968年，机会像约翰斯顿水灾奔涌而来。1969年，机会像阿尔图纳市一个水龙头漏出来的水滴。",[896,917,810],{"id":918},"低估类相对低估",[14,920,921],{},"此类投资创造的收益占1966年和1967年总收益的三分之二左右。我在去年的信里说了，这个类别连续两年取得佳绩，主要是因为我们抓住了一个机会。我还说了：“在相对低估类中，无论是看规模，还是看潜力，我们现在没有一只股票能与这只相提并论。”我感到很高兴的是，我去年说的这句话完全正确。我不太高兴的是，今年还是这个情况。",[896,923,821],{"id":821},[14,925,926],{},"1967年，我们的套利类投资彻底做砸了。1968年，我们做得很好。我们的投资方法是每年相对集中地只做几笔投资。一些专做套利的大型机构每年同时做 50多笔套利。与大量分散的方法相比，我们每年的业绩波动幅度更大。我觉得按照我们的投资方法，平均下来，我们的业绩不会差。1968年，我们的表现比1967年好，我对自己的结论也更有信心了。",[14,928,929],{},"这里还是要提醒一下，一般计算业绩的方法是以年初的数字为基准，而且在套利投资中的资金有一部分可以是借来的，按我们的方法计算，我们在套利类投资（其他几类也一样）中的业绩会略微低一些。",{"title":931,"searchDepth":932,"depth":932,"links":933},"",2,[934,935,936,937],{"id":788,"depth":932,"text":788},{"id":909,"depth":932,"text":799},{"id":918,"depth":932,"text":810},{"id":821,"depth":932,"text":821},"致股东信","1968年巴菲特致合伙人信，总结年度投资业绩及合伙基金运作哲学","md",{},true,31,"\u002Fbuffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1968-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin",{"title":5,"description":939},"1968 巴菲特致合伙人信｜巴菲特","1968-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin","buffett\u002Fberkshire\u002F1968-ba-fei-te-zhi-he-huo-ren-xin","b_C1MOgDG7safXyL4j4_AtxBzBo4qWUvYMtpi-aWnXs",1778061724010]